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I.

REVIVAL OF A DEBT BARBED BY STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-AN
ACKNOWLEDGMENT BY DEBTOR THAT HE OWES THE DEBT AS A REVIVAL
OF THE CAUSE OF ACTION

Coley v. Coley1 raised the question whether an acknowledgment
of a debt barred by the statute of limitations would remove the defense of the statute and revive the cause of action on the debt. In
that case the debtor, a druggist who sold materials to the creditor,
also owed the creditor a large sum in the amount of $13,300.00 After
the statute of limitations had run on the debt, the debtor prepared
in his own handwriting a statement of his claim which he had against
the creditor. As part of the same handwritten statement the debtor
itemized the claim which he owed the creditor, noting in the statement that he "owes" this amount to the creditor. Creditor died
and the debtor inherited a share of the creditor's estate. Counsel for
the deceased creditor's estate contended that the debtor's conduct
constituted a promise to pay the debt from his share of the creditor's
estate, thereby reviving his debt which had been barred by the
statute of limitations.
The court of appeals, affirming the lower court, held that the
conduct of the debtor constituted only an acknowledgment of his
indebtedness, was not a promise to pay it, and consequently did not
revive the debt barred by the statute of limitations. Judge Carney,
speaking for the court, felt bound by prior Tennessee Supreme Court
decisions to the effect that such an acknowledgment does not revive
*

Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Tennessee Bar.

1. 48 Tenn. App. 628, 349 S.W.2d 183 (W.S. 1960).
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the debt, but he expressed his personal view that the conduct of the
debtor did show an expression of willingness to pay the debt which
he thought sufficient to remove the defense of the statute of limitations.
Tennessee seems committed to the proposition that an acknowledgment of a debt barred by the statute of limitations does not imply a
promise to pay; consequently, such an acknowledgment does not lift
the bar of the statute.2 In taking this position, Tennessee appears to
be in a distinct minority of jurisdictions. As the late Professor Williston, that eminent authority in the field of Contracts, put it: "[I]t is
well settled in most jurisdictions that an 'unqualified acknowledgment
of present indebtedness ...unaccompanied with any evidence show-

ing a determination not to pay' is equivalent to a new promise."3
Again, Professor Williston stated the same proposition in this fashion:
"If the admission is unequivocal and unconditional, 'the law will imply
a promise to pay from a bare acknowledgment."' 4 The Restatement of
Contracts takes the same position. 5 Professor Corbin, the greatest
living authority on the law of contracts, likewise takes the position
that an acknowledgment of the debt is sufficient to remove the bar of
the statue of limitations. He summarizes the rule succinctly in these
words: "It is very generally held that an acknowledgment that a sum
of money is actually due, if made without any accompanying denial
of willingness, justifies the inference of a promise to pay."6
In the Coley case the debtor's statement that he "owes" the creditor
surely is a clear, unequivocal and unconditional acknowledgment
that he owes the debt, and from that acknowledgment it is reasonable
to imply a promise by the debtor to pay the debt. Moreover, as Judge
Carney carefully points out in his opinion, this statement by the debtor
that he "owes" the creditor was submitted to the creditor together
with the debtor's statement of the amount which the creditor owed
him. That, Judge Carney astutely concludes, is not only an acknowledgment of his debt due to the estate of the deceased creditor,
but also reasonably manifests his willingness that the debt be paid
from the debtor's share of the deceased creditor's estate.
The writer ventures to suggest that it is time for the Supreme Court
of Tennessee to reexamine its position that an unqualified acknowledgment of the existence of a debt barred by the statute of limitations
2. Hall v. Skidmore, 180 Tenn. 23, 171 S.W.2d 274 (1943) (payment of interest,
while constituting an acknowledgment of the barred debt, is not an expression of a
willingness to pay; and hence, did not remove the bar of the statute of limitations).
3. 1 WmnusToN, CoNTRACis § 166, at 670 (Jaeger ed. 1957). Many cases are
cited from a great number of jurisdictions.
4. Id. at § 669.
5. REsTATEMENT, CoNTRAcrs § 86(2)(a) (1932).
6. 1 CormiN, CoNTRACTs § 216, at 713 (1950). Many cases are cited from numerous jurisdictions.
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does not remove the bar. There appears to be no good reason why
Tennessee should not align itself with the overwhelming weight of
authority on this point, especially since this majority is supported by
Professors Williston and Corbin, who are undoubtedly the leading
authorities in the field of contract law. After all, the defense of the
statute of limitations is regarded as of such technical nature that a
promise to pay a debt barred by the statute is enforceable even
though it is purely gratuitous and not supported by any consideration.

II. RULES FOR DETERMINING PRIoRITY OF RIGHT WHERE SUCCESSIVE
ASSIGNEES COMPETING FOR SAME ASSIGNED CLAIM-APPLICABILITY OF
THOSE RuLEs IN CONTEST BETWEEN AN ASSIGNEE AND DEBTOR WHOSE
OBLIGATION HAS BEEN ASSIGNED

The court of appeals in Kivett v. Mayes' placed in proper perspective some unfortunate language regarding assignments of a chose
in action that appeared in an earlier Tennessee Supreme Court case.
In Kivett, the question was whether the failure of an assignee to give
notice to the debtor that his debt had been assigned would prevent
recovery by the assignee against the debtor. The trial court had dismissed plaintiff's suit against the debtor on the ground that such
notification was required. The court of appeals quite properly took
the position that the failure to notify the defendant8 debtor of the
assignment did not prevent plaintiff from recovering.
An earlier Tennessee Supreme Court case of DeSoto Hardwood
Flooring Co. v. Old Dominion Table & Cabinet Works9 had, unfortunately, declared that it had long been the law of Tennessee "that
the assignment of a chose in action is not complete, so as to vest
absolute title in the assignee, either as against the debtor or third
persons requiring rights, until notice of the assignment has been given
to the debtor .. "10
The court of appeals speaking through Judge McAmis, pointed out
that the DeSoto Hardwood case, as well as others using the same
unfortunate and incorrect language, involved a contest between
successive assignees of the same chose in action; thus the contest was
between two assignees of the same right. It was not a contest between
an assignee and the debtor whose debt had been assigned.
An assignment of a contract right extinguishes the right of the
7. 354 S.W.2d 492 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1961).
8. In Kivett v. Mayes, supra note 1, the court held, however, that the plaintiff
assignee had failed to carry the burden of proof showing the existence of the
alleged debt that was assigned; the plaintiff lost the case on that ground.
9. 163 Tenn. 532, 43 S.W.2d 1069 (1931).
10. Id. at 534, 43 S.W.2d at 1070. (Emphasis added.)

19631

CONTRACTS

assignor and creates a similar right in the assignee." To produce this
effect it is not necessary that notice be given to the debtor, although
until such notice is given the debtor can defeat the assignee's rights
by good faith payments to the assignor. 2 When successive assignees
are competing for the same chose in action, there are two main rules
for determining priority of claim. The so-called majority American
view is that, subject to certain exceptions, the first assignee for value
in time prevails over prior subsequent assignees of the same claim,
irrespective of notice to the debtor. 13 The rationale of this rule is that
where a chose in action has once been assigned for value, then there
is nothing left which the assignor can assign. Consequently, a subsequent assignee takes nothing by way of assignment. The second
main rule for determining priority as between successive assignees
of the same claim, known as the rule of Dearie v. Hall,14 is that
priority is determined by which assignee first gives notice to the
debtor whose debt has been assigned.'5 For many years Tennessee
has followed the rule of Deare v. Hall.16
When an assignee and a garnisheeing creditor are competing for
the same claim, priority is determined by essentially the same rules
as those used to determine priority between competing successive
assignees. Thus, one view says that priority in right is determined
by priority in time; if the assignment takes place before the claim is
garnished, the assignee takes priority irrespective of notice to the
debtor.'7 On the other hand, those states applying the Deare v. Hall
rule for determining priority among competing successive assignees
also determine in the same manner priority between a garnisheeing
creditor and an assignee of the same claim. Under this rule, a garnisheeing creditor has priority over an earlier assignee where the as11. 4 Cosmn, CoNTRACTS § 902 (1951).
12. Ibid.
13. For a discussion of the view preferring the assignee first in time, as well as the
exceptions to the rule, see 4 ConRN, CoNTnAcTs § 902 (1951); 3 WILLSToN, CON-nAcTs §§ 434-35 (Jaeger ed. 1960); REsTATEmExT, CoNTRAcTs § 173 (1932). Under
the Restatement view, a prior assignee prevails over a subsequent assignee of the same
contract right unless the subsequent assignee purchases his assignment for value in
good faith without notice of a prior assignment, and obtains either: "(i) payment or
satisfaction of the obligor's duty, or (ii) judgment against the obligor, or (iii) a new
contract with the obligor by means of a novation, or (iv) delivery of a tangible
token or writing, surrender of which is required by the obligor's contract for its
enforcement .... " Id. at 221-22. New York apparently does not recognize all the four
exceptions contained in the Restatement. Consequently New York will let the first
assignee prevail, even to the extent of recovering from the second assignee who, in
good faith, has collected the assignment from the debtor. Superior Brassiere Co. v.
Zimetbaum, 214 App. Div. 525, 212 N.Y. Supp. 473 (1925).
14. 3 Russ. 1, 38 Eng. Rep. 475 (ch. 1823).
15. Graham Paper Co. v. Pembroke, 124 Cal. 117, 56 Pac. 627 (1899).
16. Naill & Naill v. Blackwell, 164 Tenn. 615, 51 S.W.2d 835 (1932).
17. McDowell, Pyle & Co. v. Hopfield, 148 Md. 84, 128 Ad. 742 (1925).
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signee has not, before garnishment, given notice of the assignment
to the debtor whose obligation has been assigned. 18 Under this rule
an assignee will prevail over a creditor who subsequently garnishes
the same obligation, if the assignee has notified the debtor of the
assignment before the garnishment. 19 But, as the Kivett court makes
clear, the rule of Dearle v. Hall which determines priority in right
by the test of priority in notice to the obligor has no application where
the contest is solely
between the assignee and the debtor whose debt
20
has been assigned.
Tennessee has modified the Dearie v. Hall rule by statute with
respect to determining priority among successive assignees of the
same accounts receivable. A Tennessee statute now provides that an
assignee, without giving notice to the debtor whose debt has been
assigned, can make his claim safe as against a subsequent assignee or
attaching creditor by filing notice of his assignment with the secretary of state. 21
III. BREACH OF CoNTRAcr-NECESSITY FOR TENDER OF PERFORMANCE
BY PROMISEE WHERE PROMISOR CANNOT PERFORm-RIGHTS OF PiOMIsE AGAINST THmn
PARTY INDUCING BREACH OF CONTRACT
Howard v. Houck- presented two questions: (1) must a plaintiff,
suing for breach of contract to repurchase from the defendants an
interest in a business, make a tender in order to hold defendant-sellers
liable when defendants have sold the property to a third party before
performance date; and (2) is a third-party defendant who, knowing
of the repurchase agreement, bought the property from the sellers
liable in damages for procuring the breach?
In November, 1958, plaintiff (Howard) and defendants (Houcks)
owned a business known as "Abbe's Telephone Answering Service."
At that time plaintiff sold his one-half interest in this service to the
Houcks; in the contract of sale the parties agreed that plaintiff should
have an option to repurchase a one-half interest in the business from
18. DeSoto Hardwood Flooring Co. v. Old Dominion Table & Cabinet Works, 163
Tenn. 532, 43 S.W.2d 1069 (1931).

19. Moran v. Adkerson, 168 Tenn. 372, 79 S.W.2d 44 (1935).
20. See Naill & Naill v. Blackwell, 164 Tenn. 615, 618, 51 S.W.2d 835 (1932);
4 Conn,, CONTRAcTs § 902 (1951); 3 WniLLsToN, CONTRACTS §§ 433-34 (Jaeger ed.
1960).
21. TNN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-1801 to -1803 (Supp. 1962). Corn Exchange Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co. v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434 (1943), made financing through the use of the
assignment of accounts receivable vulnerable to the assignor's possible future
bankruptcy. For a discussion of state legislation subsequently enacted to protect the
assignment as a security device, see 3 W.msTON, CoNTRACTs § 435A (Jaeger ed.
1960).
22. 360 S.W.2d 55 (Tenn. 1962).
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October 1, 1961, to January 1, 1962. On or before October 1, 1961,
plaintiff notified the Houcks of his acceptance of the option. Plaintiff
also notified the defendant Judlin that he was repurchasing an interest in the business, and Judkin was warned against interfering with
plaintiff's repurchase. Nevertheless, knowing of the contract between
plaintiff and the Houcks, Judkin purchased the business from the
Houcks. Plaintiff sued the Houcks for breach of contract and Judkin
for inducing the breach of contract. All defendants demurred to
plaintiffs complaint on the ground that plaintiff had failed to comply
with his part of the contract by making a tender of performance.
The facts as above set forth were alleged in the bill of complaint.
In reversing the lower court, the Supreme Court of Tennessee
overruled the demurrer and held that plaintiff did state a cause of
action against both defendants. The court was of the opinion that it
was not necessary for plaintiff to make a formal tender as a prerequisite to his suit, the sale of the business by the Houcks having rendered
such tender unnecessary.
In overruling the demurrer, the court is on sound ground. It is an
old maxim of the law that it compels no man to do a useless act, and
this principle has been applied to the case of conditional promises.
Admittedly this option contract for the sale of the business by the
Houcks does not become a contract for the sale of the business until
the plaintiff had exercised the option in conformity with the conditions
therein prescribed. However, the option in this case differs from the
usual type in which a contract is made by an owner of property
giving an option to purchase upon stated terms and conditions. Here,
an option to repurchase was reserved by the grantor in a deed of
conveyance; when the option was exercised a binding enforceable
contract of sale came into existence.13 Since the promisors (Houcks)
could not keep their promise in any event it was useless for plaintiff
to perform the condition of making a tender; the defendant Houcks
became liable without such performance by plaintiff.2 4 A seller
(Houcks) cannot defeat recovery for breach of his contract to sell
by reason of his own default; the law does not require the doing of
a useless act by the plaintiff promisee. When the Houcks sold the
subject matter of the contract to Judkin, disabling themselves so that
they could not perform, they breached the contract.25
With regard to the defendant Judkin, the Tennessee statute provides that a right of action arises against a party procuring a breach
23. Moehling v. Pierce, 3 III. 2d 418, 121 N.E.2d 735 (1954).
24. Sisco v. Rotenberg, 104 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1958); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §
699, at 344 (Jaeger ed. 1961).
25. Lazarov v. Nunnally, 188 Tenn. 145, 217 S.W.2d 11 (1949).
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of contract. 26 In such situations the party is liable in treble the
amount of damages resulting from or incident to the breach of the
contract. Since the matter was decided upon demurrer to the complaint, the court thought that sufficient facts were alleged to state a
cause of action against Judkin.
Since plaintiff could not accept the option to repurchase the business
from the Houcks before October 1, 1961, and since the Houcks sold
the property to defendant Judkin on or about September 18, 1961,
there arises the question of what was the contract of plaintiff which
Judkin induced the Houcks to breach? The actual contract of repurchase of the business could not be consummated by plaintiff before
October 1st, and the Houcks had sold the property before that time.
The answer is clear. Plaintiff's option to repurchase the property
from the Houcks was itself the contract in question. An option has
been succinctly defined as "a contract to keep an offer open."27 When
plaintiff sold his business to the Houcks, retaining in the contract of
sale an option to repurchase a one-half interest in the business, the
option constituted a contract to keep the offer open. The consideration
received by the Houcks which made the option irrevocable was the
same consideration they received from the plaintiff in the sale of the
business in November, 1958. In short, plaintiff reserved an irrevocable
option to repurchase the business in September, 1961, as part of the
price which the Houcks paid for the business. The cases make it
clear that such an option to repurchase contained in a contract of
sale is irrevocable and enforceable.2 Thus, defendant Judkin allegedly procured the breach of the option contract which plaintiff
had with the Houcks.
26. TENN. CODE AsN. § 47-1706 (1956).
27. Warner Bros. Theatres, Inc. v. Proffitt, 329 Pa. 316, 319, 198 Atl. 56, 57 (1938);
see 1 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcrs §§ 61-61D (Jaeger ed. 1957) for a discussion of the
nature of an option and the circumstances making it irrevocable.
28. Moehling v. Pierce, 3 Ill. 2d 418, 121 N.E.2d 735 (1954) (option to repurchase real estate enforced, although seller repudiated before option accepted);
Standard Reliance Ins. Co. v. Schoenthal, 171 Neb. 490, 108 N.W.2d 704 (1960)

(option to repurchase real estate enforced, although owners giving option died before
option could be accepted); Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 534, 141 N.E.2d
812 (1957) (option of issuing corporation to repurchase shares of stock held by
stockholder, enforced against heirs of deceased stockholder).

